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NO. 51 NOVEMBER 2020 Introduction 
Preparing for the Crises after COVID-19 
Systematic Foresight as a Tool for Evidence-informed Precautionary Policy 
Lars Brozus 
Political decision-makers are regularly confronted with a large number of hypothetical 
crises. State and society expect them to make appropriate provisions to tackle these 
scenarios simultaneously. However, adequate preparation for all conceivable incidents 
in the future far exceeds the available resources. Decision-makers must therefore 
determine which of these imaginary crises should take priority. Factors such as the 
public visibility and likelihood of an expected crisis and the damage it is anticipated 
to cause play an important role in this decision. Also at play are analogy-based reason-
ing and political intuition. COVID-19 illustrates that these future heuristics entail 
significant decision-making risks. Despite many warnings about the consequences the 
spread of infectious diseases could have globally, hardly any state was adequately pre-
pared. Taking credible predictions through systematic foresight into account would 
help decision-makers to set priorities for prevention that would be easier to explain 
and justify. 
 
The new coronavirus continues to wreak 
havoc globally. More than 48 million people 
are currently reported as being infected with 
COVID-19 and more than 1.2 million have 
died. The number of unreported cases is 
likely to be significantly higher. The World 
Food Programme fears that as a result of the 
corona crisis, the number of starving people 
could increase by 120 million by the end of 
2020. According to estimates by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, the combined eco-
nomic losses of this and the next year will 
amount to roughly $11 trillion worldwide. 
In its macroeconomic projections for the 
euro area, the European Central Bank fore-
sees a decline in GDP of up to eight percent 
in 2020, while the combined budget deficits 
of the 19 countries could reach close to one 
trillion euros – an increase of almost ten 
percent. 
Dual Crisis of Connectivity and 
Governance 
In contrast to the global financial crisis of 
2008, policy coordination has generally 
been lacking during the pandemic. Regions 
initially barely affected by COVID-19 soon 
suffered the consequences of lockdown and 
quarantine decisions taken elsewhere. The 
collapse of production, trade and tourism, 
suspended mobility and capital outflows hit 
the Global South especially hard. The indus-
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try-specific concentration of production 
capacities in a small number of locations 
exacerbated the undersupply of pharma-
ceuticals and personal protective equip-
ment, even in the Global North. The result: 
a real connectivity crisis – the negative 
externalities of global interdependence are 
unsettling politics, economy and society 
the world over. 
The crisis of connectivity is also accom-
panied by a governance crisis. The role 
played by multilateral institutions in crisis 
management is virtually non-existent. So 
far, neither the UN or the G20 and G7 have 
provided significant policy guidance. Health 
protection and economic aid measures are 
decided upon predominantly nationally. 
Even within the EU, several borders were 
closed without coordination between mem-
ber states. 
Lack of Preparation, 
Despite Warnings 
Yet, the pandemic is not a black swan, i.e. 
a completely unexpected event having a 
major impact on an unprepared world. 
Over the past decade, governmental and 
non-governmental bodies have frequently 
issued warnings of an imminent pandemic 
that could have serious global consequenc-
es, including the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO). In Germany, reference is often 
made to a Federal Office for Civil Protection 
and Disaster Relief (BBK) report which looks 
at a “Pandemic caused by Virus Modi-SARS” 
and was published in 2012 by the Bundes-
tag. Bill Gates gave a TED talk in 2015 warn-
ing against a pandemic. Another example 
of such foresight is the annual Global Risks 
Report of the World Economic Forum 
(WEF), which featured the spread of infec-
tious diseases in 2019. 
Better preparation for the pandemic 
would have involved only a fraction of the 
cost of having to deal with its consequenc-
es. At the Munich Security Conference in 
2017, Bill Gates put the cost of adequate 
pandemic preparedness worldwide at $3.4 
billion per year. At the same conference, he 
estimated the losses that would be incurred 
if no measures were taken at up to $570 bil-
lion annually – a very conservative sum 
from today’s perspective. The storage of suf-
ficient quantities of protective equipment 
and diagnostic material in conjunction with 
better preparation of the health care sys-
tem, including hospitals being provided 
with more intensive care units, would have 
significantly increased the chances of early 
containment of the virus – and saved lives. 
Too Many Conceivable Crises 
Apparently, the warnings were ignored. So 
the question of why better provisions were 
not made has gained public prominence. 
However, blaming the lack of preparedness 
on the ignorance of policymakers alone 
would be too simple. It fails to acknowledge 
that in everyday politics, countless warnings, 
suggestions and ideas compete for the atten-
tion of decision-makers. Over the years, 
besides the Modi-SARS pandemic, the BBK 
discussed many other hypothetical events 
for which Germany should be prepared: ex-
treme melt flooding, severe winter storms, 
a surge in storms, the release of radioactive 
materials from a nuclear power plant, re-
lease of chemical substances, and drought. 
In addition to the spread of infectious 
diseases, the WEF’s Global Risks Report 
2019 named a variety of phenomena that 
could develop into global crises. These 
included failure to mitigate climate change, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, cyberattacks, water shortages and the 
formation of speculative bubbles in finan-
cial markets. The WEF reports for the years 
before (and after) 2019 pointed to several 
other important risks that also required 
political attention. 
In addition to BBK and WEF, many insti-
tutions and agencies publish comprehen-
sive risk reports and crisis warnings. Prepar-
ing adequately for all these hypothetical 
risks would overtax state resources and 
capacities. Decision-makers must therefore 
choose which crises to prepare for. Typical 
criteria for such decisions are the probabil-
 SWP Comment 51 
 November 2020 
 3 
ity of the event occurring and the expected 
extent of the damage it may cause. How-
ever, it is notoriously difficult to give an 
accurate estimate of when an anticipated 
risk will actually materialise. The 2019 
WEF report, for example, put the spread of 
infectious diseases in 10th place in terms 
of impact. However, its list of ten risks with 
the highest probability of occurrence does 
not include infectious diseases – as is also 
the case in the Global Risks Report 2020.  
But there have also been several instances 
of false positives – a prediction that did 
not come true – over the years. In 2009, 
the WHO sounded the alarm over swine flu 
(H1N1 virus). For the first time in over 40 
years, a pandemic was officially declared. 
The warnings turned out to be inaccurate 
and were later subject to a parliamentary 
investigation by the Council of Europe that 
accused health authorities of causing un-
justified panic and wasting public resources. 
Crying wolf can be politically costly. 
Future Heuristics in 
Everyday Politics 
In addition to calculating the impact and 
likelihood of a probable future risk, deci-
sion-makers therefore rely on political 
intuition and simple future heuristics. 
Three factors are important in this context: 
past experience, which is processed using 
analogical reasoning; the significance a 
future risk is expected to have in the public 
debate; and the likelihood of a political 
solution for the risk, which ideally should 
be attributed to the policymaker in power. 
Analogies are typically used by decision-
makers to reflect on lessons learned from 
history. Because of the complexity of under-
standing the past, including incomplete in-
formation and biased judgment, analogies 
can lead to wrong conclusions. The current 
pandemic illustrates this point. Over the past 
two decades there have been several out-
breaks of infectious diseases. Two of these 
were caused by pathogens from the corona-
virus family: SARS (2003) and MERS (2012). 
However, in both instances the expected 
global spread of the virus did not materi-
alise. Fortunately, predictions of thousands 
of deaths and sustained economic disrup-
tion did not turn out to be true.  
Given that, in policymaking, the past is 
very often the default predictor of things 
to come, it is not surprising that many deci-
sion-makers concluded that preparations 
for a pandemic were not a priority. Follow-
ing the logic of political trade-offs between 
limited resources for prevention and the 
public visibility of potential crises, which 
could translate into political pressure, 
decision-makers would tend to draw the 
analogy that elaborate and costly measures 
to prepare for future virus outbreaks need 
not be high up the precautionary agenda. 
As a result, the pandemic risk posed by 
pathogens was, once again, neglected. 
But not everywhere. Governments in 
countries that were significantly affected 
by the outbreaks of SARS and MERS drew 
a different conclusion. South Korea and 
Taiwan, for instance, invested in health 
care preparation for a future virus epidemic. 
Politically, this was justifiable because both 
societies had been exposed to significant 
vulnerability in the past. In the current 
pandemic, both countries are benefiting 
from these decisions as they are faring 
comparatively well. There was even a po-
litical reward, as the effective management 
of COVID-19 is considered an important 
factor in the unexpected success of Presi-
dent Moon’s governing party in South 
Korea’s parliamentary elections in April. 
Better Preparation through 
Foresight 
Reversing this reasoning, it can be assumed 
that global health policy will be given con-
siderably more attention and resources in 
the future. This is, of course, long overdue. 
However, it does not solve the fundamental 
problem that too many risks continue to 
compete for political attention. This prob-
lem is further exacerbated by the foresee-
able budget cuts that will reduce govern-
ments’ leeway for distributive policies. In 
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fact, the discussion about the areas that must 
be protected from budget cuts is already 
well underway. In Germany, organisations 
and institutions in the field of security 
policy were among the first to warn against 
cuts to their budgets. And indeed, their pro-
tagonists can give good reasons for taking 
a defensive stance against the threat of aus-
terity measures. Of course, nobody knows 
how great the risk of military confrontation 
in Europe actually is and which precaution-
ary measures are warranted. 
But what if we could know? Scientific 
studies show that the accuracy of predictions 
of future events (the so-called forecasts) can 
be systematically increased. If policymakers 
would learn to trust methodical forecasting, 
better informed decisions could be made 
about which events to prepare for. This 
would make political disputes over preven-
tion priorities more objective, improve the 
quality of public debate and promote evi-
dence-based precautionary policies. 
These studies are based on the analyses 
of a multi-year research project in which 
several thousand people, both laymen and 
professionals, have participated since 2011. 
The project is designed to allow the partici-
pants make as many predictions as possible 
about hypothetical political events. Partici-
pants are simply asked to answer questions 
and encouraged to update their answers as 
they see fit. Current examples of such ques-
tions could be: Will Donald Trump hold 
on to presidential powers after 20 January 
2021? Will Russia leave the Open Skies 
treaty as soon as the USA withdraws? Will 
world economic growth be positive in the 
second quarter of 2021? 
An evaluation of more than 880,000 
forecasts shows that some participants 
make the right predictions much more 
often than others. The top two percent of 
participants achieved this over several 
years. If these consistently above-average 
performers are assembled in teams, their 
combined forecast accuracy increases even 
more. The best teams achieve about 30 per-
cent higher prediction accuracy than peer 
groups with access to classified informa-
tion. Forecasting accuracy can be further 
improved through training. 
This does not mean that it will be possi-
ble to anticipate all future post-corona 
crises. However, a 30 percent increase in 
accuracy implies that the number of crises 
for which preparations should be made 
would be significantly reduced. Cost-inten-
sive and unpopular precautionary meas-
ures, in particular, would be easier to jus-
tify to a possibly sceptical public – espe-
cially if non-state actors and non-state insti-
tutions are also involved in the deliberations. 
Institutionalisation of 
Systematic Foresight 
Systematic foresight could quite easily be 
institutionalised in government agencies. 
Foreign Services would be obvious entry 
points for integrating foresight training and 
practice in the daily bureaucratic routines. 
Over time, it would be possible to build up 
a pool of methodically trained diplomats 
tasked with regularly making predictions. 
This is not very far removed from everyday 
practice in a Foreign Service. An important 
task of diplomacy is, of course, to deal with 
and prepare for conceivable developments. 
Increasing the accuracy of predictions 
would give diplomats’ recommendations 
for action more weight in decision-making. 
At the international level, systematic 
foresight could be institutionalised in mul-
tilateral contexts. Foresight is traditionally 
the task of nation-states. This automatically 
limits the field of vision. Taking multiple 
interests and perspectives into account 
would broaden it. Multi-perspective fore-
sight could transcend national positions 
and help to identify global challenges ear-
lier and with greater accuracy. In 2019, 
France and Germany launched the Alliance 
for Multilateralism to improve global gov-
ernance. Systematic foresight could be a 
very promising instrument to support the 
achievement of this worthy goal. 
Dr Lars Brozus is Senior Fellow of The America Division at SWP. 
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